欧洲对俄一致,能否容得下“各自打电话”?|中英对照

问AI · 丹麦批评单独行动折射欧洲哪些协调难题?

Club 提要:芬兰和挪威领导人主动致电普京,打破了欧洲对俄高层接触的沉寂,也引来丹麦对其“单独行动”的批评。11 月 2 日,中美研究中心(ICAS)主任、北京对话特约专家洪农在《南华早报》撰文指出,两国的逻辑并不复杂:作为俄罗斯的直接邻国,它们有自己的安全关切,也需要直接了解莫斯科的立场。 

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洪农在南华早报发文(图源:《南华早报》网页截图)

对于俄罗斯的邻国而言,直接与俄方开展外交接触,是表达自身关切、让那些在更大范围谈判中容易被忽视的声音得到应有重视的重要机会。

芬兰总统斯图布(Alexander Stubb)和挪威首相斯特勒(Jonas Gahr Støre)10月27日和俄罗斯总统普京(Vladimir Putin)的通话是一项不同寻常的外交举措,此前,欧洲各国政府与莫斯科之间的高层直接接触十分有限。此次通话由两位北欧领导人在新一轮和平谈判重启前主动发起,但也因缺乏更广泛的欧洲协调而受到丹麦方面的批评。

此次通话并不意味着芬兰或挪威对俄立场发生变化。两国仍坚定支持北约,并继续支持乌克兰。两国的这一举措实际上提出了一个随着外交努力不断推进而日益重要的问题:欧洲国家应如何在坚持对俄罗斯采取共同立场的同时,维护自身的安全利益?

对于芬兰和挪威而言,与俄罗斯保持直接接触并非新鲜事,但两国在处理对俄关系方面有着不同的经验。长期以来,挪威一直将威慑与安抚相结合,即使在政治关系恶化的情况下,仍保持沟通渠道畅通。挪威2025年《国家安全战略》提出,应对俄采取连贯且可预期的政策,并与北约盟友密切协调。

就在此次通话前四天,挪威与俄罗斯达成了2027年渔业协议。这是双方自2019年以来首次举行面对面谈判。尽管双方在制裁问题上仍存在持续争议,该协议最终仍得以达成,这表明即使政治关系持续紧张,双方在务实领域的合作仍在继续。

芬兰于2023年加入北约,此后对俄采取了坚定立场,但同时也没有排除未来开展接触的可能性。斯图布在今年8月的一次演讲中承认,芬兰最终需要重新界定其与俄罗斯这一邻国的关系,同时明确表示,双边关系的未来将取决于俄罗斯的行动。

这些经验表明,与俄罗斯保持接触可以服务于不同目的。挪威与俄罗斯的渔业合作建立在既有制度和共同的务实利益之上,而芬兰则为未来开展政治接触保留了空间。

10月27日的通话进一步深入,双方领导人与普京就乌克兰问题以及结束俄罗斯对乌特别军事行动的努力进行了直接讨论。然而,此类高层外交涉及的问题更具争议性,务实领域合作的延续并不能保证谈判取得进展。

对于芬兰和挪威而言,与俄罗斯做邻居,使两国面临着特殊的安全关切。芬兰与俄罗斯拥有漫长的陆地边界,因此,俄罗斯军事部署的变化以及地区安全安排的调整,与芬兰的国防规划密切相关。挪威则面临来自北极高纬地区的不同挑战,当地的军事活动、海上安全以及跨境关系始终是重要议题。

乌克兰和平协议或许能够结束战事,但有关俄罗斯在该地区的军事存在以及北约在北欧的安全安排等棘手问题仍将持续存在。即使谈判结束,芬兰和挪威仍将长期应对这些问题。

在10月27日的通话前,奥斯陆举行了一系列磋商,参与方包括乌克兰、美国、其他欧洲国家代表以及北约方面。通话结束后,斯特勒表示,欧洲各国政府应当拥有自己与俄罗斯沟通的渠道,而不应仅仅依赖美国。

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从左至右:芬兰总统斯图布、挪威首相斯特勒和乌克兰总统泽连斯基于10月20日在奥斯陆出席会议。(图源:法新社/乌克兰总统府新闻局)

芬兰和挪威强调,两国在通话前已与乌克兰进行磋商,且此次通话代表的是各自政府的立场,而非欧洲立场。随后,乌克兰总统泽连斯基对两国提供的外交支持表示欢迎,并讨论了进一步谈判的准备工作。

这一通话的意义还在于,它触及了欧洲在谈判中所处地位这一更广泛的问题。即使欧洲国家没有直接参与协议条款的制定,也必须承担任何协议所带来的安全后果。对于俄罗斯的邻国而言,直接开展外交接触提供了一个额外的机会,使其能够表达那些在更大范围谈判中可能无法得到同等重视的关切。

然而,能够与俄罗斯接触,并不意味着就能影响其决策。克里姆林宫几乎没有释放出任何改变谈判立场的信号。尽管如此,直接接触仍可能发挥一定作用,使芬兰和挪威能够第一时间了解莫斯科的立场,并传达自身的关切。此类接触是否值得开展,在欧洲各国政府之间仍存在争议。

丹麦首相弗雷泽里克森(Mette Frederiksen)批评了这一举措,对其实际价值提出质疑,并呼吁加强欧洲内部协调。瑞典首相克里斯特松(Ulf Kristersson)也对这次通话表达了保留意见。斯图布和斯特勒则回应称,他们已提前向合作伙伴和盟友通报了相关情况。然而,提前获悉一项外交举措,并不等同于参与其决策和制定过程。

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丹麦首相弗雷泽里克森在北欧理事会会议期间批评芬兰和挪威两国“单独行动”削弱欧洲团结 (图源:Deutsche Welle)

欧洲各国政府可以在支持乌克兰这一问题上达成共识,但在何时以及如何与俄罗斯接触方面仍可能存在分歧。与俄罗斯接壤的国家或许有着更为充分的理由保持直接沟通渠道,但此类举措仍需与相关伙伴进行协商,并明确其所代表的利益立场。

10月27日的通话并未取得任何公开宣布的突破性进展,但这一举措仍表明,随着围绕乌克兰问题的谈判不断推进,俄罗斯的邻国正试图在外交进程中发挥直接作用。即使相关谈判已经结束,芬兰和挪威仍将长期应对任何和平协议所带来的安全后果。

欧洲面临的任务,是在确保各国自主行为服务于协调一致的外交努力的同时,为这些安全关切留出表达空间。在对俄问题上保持团结,并不意味着各国必须采用完全相同的沟通渠道。

(英文原文发表于《南华早报》(South China Morning Post)链接:https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3372876/finland-and-norways-call-putin-tests-european-unity-over-russia)

以下为英文原文:

For Russia’s neighbors, direct diplomatic contact is a chance to voice concerns that don’t receive equal attention in broader negotiations.

When Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store called Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 27, they took an unusual diplomatic step at a time when direct high-level contact between European governments and Moscow has been limited. The call, initiated by the two Nordic leaders ahead of renewed peace negotiations, also drew criticism from Denmark over the lack of broader European coordination.

The call did not signal a change in Finland or Norway’s position towards Russia. Both remain committed to NATO and continue to support Ukraine. Their initiative points instead to a question that will become increasingly important as diplomatic efforts advance: how can European countries pursue their own security interests while maintaining a common approach towards Moscow?

For Finland and Norway, direct contact with Russia is not new, although the two countries have different experiences of managing the relationship. Norway has long combined deterrence with reassurance, keeping channels of communication open even as political relations have deteriorated. Its 2025 National Security Strategy calls for a consistent and predictable approach towards Russia, coordinated closely with allies in the transatlantic alliance.

Just four days before the call, Norway and Russia reached a fisheries agreement for 2027, following their first face-to-face negotiations since 2019. The agreement came despite continuing disputes over sanctions, showing that practical cooperation has continued even as political relations remain strained.

Finland, which joined NATO in 2023, has taken a firm position towards Russia while leaving open the possibility of future engagement. In an August speech, Stubb acknowledged that Finland would eventually need to redefine its relationship with Russia as a neighbor, while also making clear that the future of that relationship would depend on Moscow’s actions.

These experiences show that maintaining contact with Russia can serve different purposes. Norway’s fisheries cooperation rests on established institutions and shared practical interests, while Finland has kept open the possibility of future political engagement.

The October 27 call went further, bringing both leaders into direct discussions with Putin over Ukraine and efforts to end the Russian invasion. Such high-level diplomacy involves more contentious questions, however, and the continuation of practical cooperation offers no guarantee of progress in negotiations.

For Finland and Norway, being near Russia gives them particular security concerns. Finland shares a long land border, making changes in Russian military deployments and regional security arrangements especially relevant to its defence planning. Norway faces different challenges in the High North, where military activity, maritime security and cross-border relations remain important.

A peace settlement in Ukraine might end the fighting, but difficult questions about Russia’s military presence and NATO’s security arrangements in northern Europe will remain. Finland and Norway will have to deal with these issues long after negotiations end.

The October 27 call followed consultations in Oslo involving Ukraine, the United States, other European representatives and Nato. Following the call, Store argued that European governments should have their own channels of communication with Moscow rather than relying solely on Washington.

Finland and Norway emphasized that they had consulted Ukraine before the call and were speaking on behalf of their own governments, not Europe as a whole. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky subsequently welcomed their diplomatic support and discussed preparations for further negotiations.

The significance of this initiative also lies in the wider question of Europe’s place in the negotiations. European countries will have to live with the security consequences of any agreement, even if they are not directly involved in determining its terms. For Russia’s neighbors direct diplomatic contact provides an additional opportunity to express concerns that might not receive equal attention in broader negotiations.

However, access to Moscow does not guarantee influence over Russian decisions. The Kremlin has given little indication of a change in its negotiating position. Direct engagement might still serve a purpose by allowing Finland and Norway to hear Moscow’s position first-hand and communicate their own concerns. Whether such contacts are worthwhile is a matter of debate among European governments.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticized the initiative, questioning its value and calling for greater European coordination. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about the call. Stubb and Store responded that partners and allies had been informed in advance. Being informed about an initiative, however, is not the same as helping to shape it.

European governments can agree on their support for Ukraine while differing over when and how to engage Moscow. Countries bordering Russia might have particular reasons to maintain direct contacts, but such initiatives require consultation with relevant partners and clarity about whose interests they represent.

The October 27 call produced no publicly announced breakthrough, but it nevertheless shows how Russia’s neighbors can seek a direct role in diplomacy as negotiations over Ukraine evolve. Finland and Norway will have to manage the security consequences of any settlement long after the talks themselves have ended.

Europe’s task is to make room for those concerns while ensuring national initiatives support a coherent diplomatic effort. Unity over Russia does not require identical channels of communication.