风险提示：本文所提到的观点仅代表个人的意见，所涉及标的不作推荐，据此买卖，风险自负。
作者：炼金女王
来源：雪球
昨天在看一本老书《至高无上》，作者分享了8位英国顶尖投资经理，除了安东尼波顿，还有祖鲁法则的吉姆斯莱特和新兴市场投资大佬莫比尔斯。其中，有一位叫伊恩・拉什布鲁克，说实话，我是第一次听说这个名字，查询之后，先是被他的投资收益折服，伊恩在执掌PAT期间，将基金规模1990年的550万英镑（其中大部分为其个人资金），增长至2008年的1.6亿英镑，近20年实现29倍规模增长，且投资收益持续大幅跑赢英国大盘指数；但更让我扼腕叹息的是，他于2008年去世，年仅68岁，在投资的世界，活得久才是关键。
伊恩的投资策略是基于不亏钱为基础设计的，重视仓位管理，市场高估时会提升现金的比例。并且善于用定量分析来做宏观择时和股票排除。更为触动我，以及和我想法不谋而合的就是，伊恩的灵活性。他可以投资大盘股，也可以投资小盘股，可以投资英国市场，也会涉足全球市场，哪里机会大就去哪里，而不是将自己桎梏在一个圈子里。
最早以前我会狭隘的理解3P投资，就是简单的低市盈率，低市净率，股价创新低，但随着与大师为伍，投资实践，我渐渐地理解，投资其实就是遵循常识，我们要买能真正创造价值，具备成长潜力，拥有一定垄断能力、持续产生自由现金流，负债可控，管理层好、价格美丽（避免价值陷阱）的公司。（我持仓中有不少需要都卖掉！）
伊恩，并未出版过任何书籍，但是在2001年8月PAT 基金的季度通讯中，总结了他40年投资生涯的十条投资法则，在这里将分享给大家。
《Ten Rules for Investment – the best investment advice you will ever get》
投资十条法则——你能得到的最佳投资建议
——精炼版
1、看每股增长，不看规模扩张，拒绝并购式虚胖。
2、极度厌恶高负债，优先股东利益，远离杠杆陷阱。
3、用总资本回报率（ROCE）判断盈利，不被负债拉高的ROE欺骗。
4、不重复研究，重点找市场估值里的逻辑错误。
5、警惕 “看起来极度便宜” 的标的，便宜多事出有因。
6、只投你认可、愿意追随其管理层的公司。
7、不懂不做，不投看不懂业务与商业模式的企业。
8、宁缺毋滥，一年只抓少数真正优质机会，耐心等待。
9、低换手、少交易，用 “不折腾” 保护收益。
10、保持独立客观，不被人情交易绑架决策。
——原文版：
1. Only invest in companies with growth in revenues per share and avoid companies that grow by acquisition.
Mere grows in size is of no benefit to shareholders. The value of the shares is determined not by the size of the company as a whole but by the revenues, earnings and dividends per share, and their rate of growth.
1. 只投资于每股收入增长的公司，避开那些靠收购扩张的企业。
单纯的企业规模扩张对股东并无益处。股票的价值不取决于公司的整体规模，而取决于每股收入、每股收益和每股股息及其增长率。
2. Avoid highly geared companies like the plague – debt is crippling to management flexibility and corporate growth.
Even though this may sound counterintuitive as equity investors are always inclined to think that gearing is good. Yet the financial graveyard is littered with companies which borrowed too much and came unstuck.
Running a highly geared company also means that the interests of the shareholders is not first in the minds of management but that creditors are. That is never a good situation..
2. 像避开瘟疫一样远离高杠杆公司——债务会严重束缚管理层的灵活性，阻碍企业增长。
尽管这听起来可能有些反直觉，因为股票投资者总是倾向于认为杠杆是好事。然而，金融业的坟墓里，遍地是因借贷过多而崩塌的公司。
经营一家高杠杆公司还意味着，管理层优先考虑的不是股东利益，而是债权人。这绝不是什么好局面。
3. Only invest in companies with an attractive return on total capital employed as opposed to simple and high ROE achieved through debt.
Calculating the return on equity while ignoring the rest of capital employed is a grave mistake. Equity, because of write-offs can also be negative. This would mean that even a small profit will give an infinite ROE.
A better measure of measuring returns is to calculate the return on total capital employed which includes debt, and if you like, deferred tax liabilities which is really an interest free loan from the government.
Return on capital employed is calculated by dividing net profit (before or after tax whatever you prefer) by total equity plus total debt (plus deferred tax liabilities)
3. 只投资于投入总资本回报率诱人的公司，而不是那些通过债务实现高净资产收益率的公司。
计算净资产收益率而忽视其他投入资本，是一个严重错误。由于资产核销，净资产也可能是负数。这意味着即使微薄的利润也会产生无穷大的净资产收益率。
更好的衡量方法是计算投入总资本回报率，它包括债务，如果你愿意的话，还可以包括递延所得税负债——这实际上是政府提供的一笔无息贷款。
投入资本回报率（ROCE）的计算方法是：净利润（税前或税后均可）÷（总权益 + 总负债 ），总负债包括 递延所得税负债。
另外，重点关注两个指标，《至高无上》有提到，拉什布鲁克的投资智慧在于：无论通胀高低，企业的本质不会变——它必须有效地将投入转化为产出和利润。
4. The market does 95% of the work for you – your problem is not to duplicate research but to identify errors of logic in company evaluations.
Ian gives an example of banks being the dogs of the stock market in the 1970s and 1980s. Periods of high inflation.
Yet over the five-year period until 2001 banks make shareholders millions. Not because major broking analysts were not analyzing them properly. It was because most investors had failed to spot how attractive banks had become in the new low inflation environment.
Ian mentions that he was never in favor of and always scepitical of the idea of new macroeconomic paradigms. He however mentioned that new paradigms for individual companies and sectors really can emerge. Helping to spot them is an important part of a fund manager’s job.
4. 市场已经为你完成了95%的工作——你的问题不是重复研究，而是找出公司估值中的逻辑错误。
伊恩举例说明了银行股在20世纪七八十年代（高通胀时期）曾是股市的弃儿。
然而，在截至2001年的五年里，银行股为股东赚取了巨额利润。这不是因为主流券商分析师没有正确分析它们，而是因为大多数投资者未能发现，在新的低通胀环境下，银行股已变得多么诱人。
伊恩提到，他从不赞成且始终对“新宏观经济范式”的观点持怀疑态度。不过他指出，针对个别公司和行业的“新范式”确实可能出现。帮助发现这些变化，是基金经理工作的重要部分。
5. Against the market at any point in time, that which looks statistically cheap is probably dear and visa versa.
What Ian is saying is that there is usually a good reason for apparent valuation anomalies.
This can be summed up as generally speaking the market knows more than you do and there is usually a good reason for apparent anomalies, one market sector being remarkably inexpensive for example.
Be very careful before investing in such anomalies without doing thorough research.
5. 在任何时点上，与市场相比，那些统计上看起来很便宜的股票很可能其实是贵的，反之亦然。
伊恩的意思是，表面上的估值异常通常有其合理的解释。
这可以概括为：总的来说，市场知道得比你多，表面上的异常——比如某个行业板块异常便宜——通常有其充分理由。
在没有进行深入研究之前，投资此类异常要格外谨慎。
6. Only invest in companies where you would be willing to work for the chief executive.
This can usually be determined to the answering of a few simple questions.
From the coverage in the media would you as a young person gladly follow such a person?
Can he articulate a sound strategy?
Does he have the charisma to give the company a sense of purpose and excitement?
6. 只投资那些你愿意为其首席执行官工作的公司。
这通常可以通过回答几个简单问题来判断：
从媒体报道来看，如果你是个年轻人，你会乐意追随这样一个人吗？
他能清晰阐述合理的战略吗？
他有魅力让公司充满使命感和激情吗？
7. If you do not understand the product or service do not invest in the company.
The most striking example of this rule took place in the time of the South Sea bubble in 1720 when a company was successfully promoted as “for an undertaking which shall in due time be revealed”.
Compare that to the “clicks not profits” idea from the internet bubble and it just goes to show human nature does not change.
7. 如果你不理解产品或服务，就不要投资这家公司。
这条规则最突出的例子发生在1720年南海泡沫期间，当时有一家公司成功募集资金，宣传语却是“从事一项待时机成熟方予披露的事业”。
将其与互联网泡沫时期的“点击量，不盈利”理念相比较，只能说明人性从未改变。
8. Working full-time in investment you will probably only see two or three outstanding investment opportunities in a year – be prepared to wait for them.
Investing can sometimes be a lonely and boring pursuit as Warren Buffett has said many times.
Not being able to sit on their hands is probably the biggest problems fund managers have as they think they must show activity to justify their fees.
8. 即使全职从事投资，你一年可能也只能发现两三个绝佳的投资机会——要耐心等待。
正如沃伦·巴菲特多次说过的，投资有时是一件孤独而枯燥的事。
基金经理最大的问题可能就是管不住自己的手，因为他们觉得自己必须有所动作，才能证明收取管理费是合理的。
9. Minimise portfolio turnover.
That is best summarized by the quote “if there’s nothing worth doing it’s worth doing nothing”.
Portfolio turnover can be a substantial drag on your investment returns. Even with internet dealing decreasing transaction costs it still costs about 1% to get in and out of a position.
And with government looking to tax anything and everything this may go up even more.
9. 尽量减少投资组合的换手率。
这句话最好地概括了这一点：“如果没有值得做的事，那就不做。”
投资组合换手率会严重拖累你的投资回报。即使互联网交易降低了交易成本，进出一次头寸仍需花费约1%的成本。
而且，随着政府想方设法对一切征税，这一成本可能还会上升。
10. Entertain your broker at your expense rather than his – this will improve his advice dramatically.
If you are entertained by your broker you often feel duty bound to pay for it by placing an order. But if you can afford your own lunches it’s better to keep your investment objectivity by entertaining your broker.
This way he will feel obligated to give you a few good ideas. Always a good position to be in and probably the best meal you ever paid for.
Like good advice on any matter a lot of the points mentioned above are simple common sense.
The only problem is common sense in not that common.
10. 由你做东请你的经纪人吃饭，而不是让他请你——这会显著改善他的建议质量。
如果你接受了经纪人的款待，你往往会觉得有义务下一个订单来“回报”他。但如果你负担得起自己的午餐，最好由你做东请经纪人，从而保持你的投资客观性。
这样，他会觉得有义务给你一些好点子。这始终是一个有利的位置，而且可能是你吃过的最值的一顿饭。