【新刊速递】《外交政策分析》(FPA), Vol.21, No.2, 2025 | 国政学人

题目：Deserving Special Treatment? The Effect of Psychological Entitlement on Support for International Law

作者：Florian Justwan，爱达荷大学政治学助教授；Jeffrey D Berejikian，佐治亚大学国际事务系教授；Shawn Mazdeyasnan，佐治亚大学国际事务博士候选人。

摘要：心理学的先前研究已将心理特权（Psychological Entitlement，PE）识别为影响人类各种态度和行为的重要变量。心理特权是个人层面的性格特质，描述个人期盼获得无正当理由、不劳而获的奖励的倾向。在该文中，笔者以心理学的现有研究为基础，研究了心理特权对外交政策态度的影响。理论上，笔者预期心理特权得分高的人在美国例外主义上的得分也会更高，因此，他们对国际法持更加消极的态度。笔者通过美国成年人口的全国代表性样本，检验了理论假设。受访者被询问了大量旨在挖掘他们的PE分数、外交政策态度和一般人口特征的问题。笔者的模型为其理论预期提供了广泛的支持。实验性的后续分析（其中调整了特权水平）支持了笔者的发现。

Previous studies in Psychology have identified Psychological Entitlement (PE) as an important variable that affects a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors in humans. PE is an individual-level character trait that describes a tendency to expect unwarranted and unearned rewards. In this paper, we build on existing research in Psychology and we investigate the effect of PE on foreign policy attitudes. Theoretically, we expect that those who score high on PE will score higher on American exceptionalism and—as a result—they will have more negative attitudes toward international law. We test our hypotheses on a nationally representative sample of the United States adult population. Respondents were asked a number of questions designed to tap into their PE scores, foreign policy attitudes, and general demographic characteristics. Our models provide broad support for our theoretical expectations. An experimental follow-up analysis (in which entitlement levels were manipulated) corroborates our findings.

题目：Binary Role Theory and Modeling the Superpower Confrontation in Ukraine

作者：Stephen G Walker，亚利桑那州立大学政治与全球研究名誉教授；Akan Malici，福尔曼大学政治与国际事务教授。

摘要：2022年2月24日，俄乌冲突发生。华盛顿以经济制裁和大量军事武器以及情报作为回应，这是自1962年古巴导弹危机以来两个超级大国之间最危险的局面。笔者的分析提出了基于二元角色理论的模型，这些模型使笔者能够识别，美国和俄罗斯在外交政策决策过程的判断和规则制定阶段作为战略对代理人的相应角色。笔者的实证焦点是重大决策事件，按时间顺序排列有两个相对重大的决策：1994年美国决定邀请前华约成员国加入北约；2022年俄罗斯决定与乌克兰发生冲突。笔者提出的一般方法受到学界与政策分析界之间有关外交政策执行的“弥合分歧”目标的启发，重点是社会权力在世界政治中的行使。

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine. Washington responded with economic sanctions and significant military arms and intelligence in the most dangerous situation between the two superpowers since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Our analysis presents models from binary role theory, which allow us to identify the respective roles of the United States and Russia as agents in a strategic dyad during the diagnostic and prescriptive stages of the foreign policy decision-making process. Our empirical focus is on crucial decision-making episodes bracketed chronologically by two relatively big decisions: the United States decision in 1994 to invite former Warsaw Pact member states to join NATO and the Russian decision in 2022 to invade Ukraine. Our general approach is inspired by the goal of “bridging the gap” between academic and policy analyses regarding the conduct of foreign policy with a focus on the exercise of social power in world politics.

题目：To What End? Policy Objectives and US Public Support for Political Warfare

作者：Dov H Levin，香港大学政治与公共行政学系副教授；Paul Musgrave，卡塔尔乔治城大学政府学副教授。

摘要：军事干预措施的相关研究表明，干预的目标（例如，它是出于人道主义还是权力政治目的而实施）显著影响着公众支持。然而，这是否适用于选举干预等政治战争策略尚属未知。在一系列的调查实验中，笔者评估了不同的目标如何影响美国观众对外国选举干预的支持，包括整体支持以及与其他形式的政治战争（如制裁和秘密政权更迭）相关的支持。相比为避免对美国领导地位的威胁或促进美国经济利益而实施的干预，人道主义目标获得了受访者更多的支持。此外，宗教身份影响着受访者对为了人道主义目标而实施的干预的支持，受访者和受害者的身份一致性也在很大程度上影响着支持。最后，对党派选举干预和其他形式的政治战争的支持会随彼此与干预目标而变化。

Research regarding military interventions suggests that the objective of an intervention (such as whether it is carried out for humanitarian or power-political ends) substantially influences public support. It is unknown, however, whether that holds for political warfare strategies such as electoral interventions. In a series of survey experiments, we evaluate how different objectives affect US audiences’ support for foreign electoral interventions, both overall and in relation to other forms of political warfare, such as sanctions and covert regime change. Humanitarian objectives elicit greater support than those carried out to stave off threats to US leadership or to promote US economic interests. Furthermore, religious identity affects support for interventions undertaken for humanitarian ends, with the congruence between the identity of respondents and victims substantially influencing support. Finally, support for partisan electoral interventions and other forms of political warfare varies in relation to each other and in relation to interventions’ objectives.

题目：Geocultural Power in the Red Sea Region

作者：Jan Bachmann，哥德堡大学和平与发展研究副教授；Bizusew Ashagrie，哥德堡大学全球研究学院助教授；Ozan Kuyumcuoğlu，伊斯坎布尔比尔基大学博士；Isabell Schierenbeck，哥德堡大学全球研究学院教授。

摘要：在该研究中，笔者提出，传统地缘政治与地缘经济论点旨在理解中东与非洲之角国家之间的日益增加的参与，它们通常认为文化和历史观念并不重要，然而正是这些观念支撑着红海两岸发展起来的合作叙事。为了解决这一理论缺陷，笔者转向地缘文化权力概念，即追求外交政策议程的过程中动员文化和历史属性，包括象征性和物质性；作为一个特别有用的启发式方法，它能被用于理解红海地区外交政策制定中援引的大量历史与文化主张。通过对埃塞俄比亚与海湾国家关系的转变、土耳其在非洲之角日益增加的参与相关的地缘文化叙事的简短讨论，笔者例证了该概念的效用。虽然该研究的主要贡献是概述了运用地缘文化权力视角的研究议程，但笔者也提出，国家并不是制定地缘政治主张的唯一领域。因此，未来的研究应该评估地缘文化主张如何在不同的社会领域受到肯定、争论和颠覆。

In this research note, we argue that traditional geopolitical and geoeconomic arguments that seek to make sense of growing engagements between countries of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa often ascribe little significance to notions of culture and history that underpin the narratives of collaborations that have developed across the Red Sea. To address this shortcoming, we turn to the concept of geocultural power—understood as the mobilization of cultural and historical attributes, both symbolic and material, in the pursuit of foreign policy agendas—as a particularly useful heuristic for making sense of the wealth of historical and cultural claims invoked in foreign policymaking in the Red Sea region. We illustrate the utility of the concept through a short discussion of geocultural narratives related to Ethiopia's shifting relations with the Gulf States and Turkey's increasing engagement in the Horn of Africa. While the research note's primary contribution is to outline a research agenda for using the lens of geocultural power, we also argue that states are not the sole arenas in which geopolitical claims are formulated. Hence, future studies should examine how geocultural claims encounter affirmation, contestation, and subversion in different societal arenas.

题目：Shrouded in Secrecy: Explaining Why Some Countries Refuse to Disclose Their Military Aid to Ukraine

作者：Marius Ghincea，苏黎世联邦理工学院博士后研究员。

摘要：该研究研究了中东欧（CEE）国家在俄乌冲突发生后披露或隐瞒对乌军事援助信息时采用的信息策略。运用比较案例研究设计，该研究分析了罗马尼亚与波兰的不同策略。笔者探讨了有关军事援助信息保密或透明的三个相互竞争的解释：避免国内反弹，外部安全考虑和官僚主义文化。研究结果表明，选举激励驱动罗马尼亚选择保密而波兰选择透明。该研究为理解外交政策保密和国际关系中的军事援助政治做出了实证贡献，突出了政治领导人如何依靠保密来防止军事援助政治化。

This research note examines the communication strategies employed by Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in disclosing or withholding information about their military aid to Ukraine following the Russian invasion. Using a comparative case study design, this research note analyzes the contrasting approaches of Romania and Poland. It explores three competing explanations for the secrecy or transparency surrounding military aid: domestic backlash avoidance, external security considerations, and bureaucratic culture. The findings reveal that electoral incentives drove both Romania's secrecy and Poland's transparency. This research note makes an empirical contribution to the understanding of foreign policy secrecy and the politics of military assistance in international relations, highlighting how political leaders may rely on secrecy to prevent the politicization of military aid.

题目：Comparative Public Attitudes about Drone Strikes: Survey Experiments in Italy, Poland, and Germany

作者：Diletta Alparone，前莱顿大学项目助理；Jaroslaw Kantorowicz，莱顿大学安全与全球事务研究所助教授；Graig R Klein，莱顿大学安全与全球事务研究所助教授。

摘要：有关无人机打击的使用和功效的公众态度研究主要集中于美国。尽管有关无人机打击和无人机战争的第二代公众舆论研究发展迅速，但总的来说，学界对相关跨国公众态度的理解仍然尚浅，尤其是当非美国受访者的行为和/或思考不同时。为了解决这一问题，笔者扩展了克雷普（Krep 2014）以及沃尔什与舒尔茨克（Walsh and Schulzke 2018）的研究，并在三个国家（意大利，波兰和德国）实施了四次调查，共有5485名受访者参与，研究美国以外的个人如何阐释与支持无人机打击相关的伦理、道德和伤亡厌恶框架。研究结果表明，三个国家的受访者与美国受访者一样，相比传统军事行动更倾向于无人机打击，但当受访者受到伦理与道德框架提示时，对无人机打击的支持会减少。与传统的军事行动相比，有关伤亡厌恶和减少退伍生活的身体风险的额外信息不会显著影响对无人机打击的支持。

Research on public attitudes about the use and efficacy of drone strikes primarily focuses on the United States. While there is a burgeoning second generation of public opinion research on drone strikes and drone warfare, in general, our understanding of cross-national public attitudes remains limited, particularly if non-US respondents behave and/or think differently. To address this, we extend Krep’s (2014) and Walsh and Schulzke’s (2018) research and conduct four surveys in three countries (Italy, Poland, and Germany) with 5,485 respondents to investigate how individuals outside the United States interpret ethical, moral, and casualty aversion framing in relation to support for drone strikes. Our results show that in all three countries, like the United States, respondents prefer drone strikes to traditional military operations but that support for drone strikes decreases when prompted with ethical and moral framing. Additional information about casualty aversion and reducing the physical risk to servicemembers’ lives does not significantly influence support for drone strikes compared to traditional military operations.

题目：Testing the Waters: Exploring Why Democracies Have More Maritime Conflict

作者：Chase LaSpisa，爱荷华大学政治科学博士候选人；Sara McLaughlin Mitchell，爱荷华大学政治学教授和法学院教授。

摘要：虽然民主和平论文献发现，与其他政体配对相比，民主国家配对面临的国家间冲突风险较低，但海洋冲突文献常常发现，在所有政体配对中，民主二元组发生海洋外交冲突的风险最高。尽管有这一令人惊讶的发现，但距离理解驱动着民主国家间热衷于海事冲突的具体政治机制仍有差距。笔者研究了民主国家是否整体上有更多的机会发生海事冲突；民主的特定维度是否影响海事冲突（国内利益和行政约束），包括区分总统民主制和议会民主制；海上领土完整规范是否较弱。笔者发现，沿海国家比内陆国家更民主，拥有海洋主张的沿海二元组比和平的沿海二元组更民主。笔者也证明了民主政体的多元维度有助于解释民主海事冲突的模式，并且具有更强国内利益和更受约束的行政官（尤其是总统民主国家）的二元组更有可能发生海事冲突。最后，笔者表明领土完整规范对海上冲突行为的影响较弱，这有助于我们理解为什么民主国家在海事领域的修正主义行为可能受到较少的限制。

While the democratic peace literature finds that pairs of democracies face lower risks for interstate conflict than other regime pairings, the maritime conflict literature often finds that democratic dyads have the highest risks for maritime diplomatic conflicts out of all regime pairings. Despite this surprising finding, there remains a gap for understanding what specific political mechanisms are driving democracies to engage in maritime conflict with other democracies. We explore whether democracies have more opportunities for maritime conflict generally, whether specific dimensions of democracy influence maritime conflict (domestic interests and executive constraints), including distinguishing between presidential and parliamentary democracies, and whether territorial integrity norms are weaker at sea. We find that coastal states are more democratic than landlocked states and that coastal dyads with maritime claims are more democratic than peaceful coastal dyads. We also show that multiple dimensions for democracy help explain the pattern of democratic maritime conflicts and that dyads with stronger domestic interests and more constrained executives (especially presidential democracies) are more likely to experience maritime conflicts. Finally, we show that territorial integrity norms have weaker effects on maritime conflict behavior, which helps us understand why democracies may be less constrained in their revisionist behavior in the maritime arena.

审校 | 赖永祯