【新刊速递】《国际安全》(IS), Vol. 49, No. 3, Winter 2025 | 国政学人

作者：Barry R. Posen，麻省理工学院福特国际政治学教授。

摘要：2022年爆发的俄乌战争符合预防性战争的逻辑。由于担忧军事力量平衡不断变化带来的后果，各国经常通过发动战争的方式以绝后患。他们担忧的是，一旦军事平衡发生改变，崛起国可能会试图对其进行胁迫，或在更有利的情况下发动战争。当衰落国同样认为自己有一个特殊的、稍纵即逝的时机来阻止这种变化时，就会更倾向于发动预防性战争。通过回顾一系列证据，本文认为弗拉基米尔·普京很可能以预防性战争的框架来看待俄罗斯的战略局势。乌克兰加入北约将使力量平衡朝着不利于俄罗斯的方向调转，而在乔·拜登执政期间，美国和北约加强了与乌克兰的军事合作。这一系列事态发展很可能使普京相信，俄罗斯并没有太多时间来阻止乌克兰加入北约。

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is consistent with the logic of preventive war. States often initiate wars because they fear the consequences of a shifting balance of military power and thus strike to forestall it. They fear that, once the balance changes, the rising power may either attempt to coerce them, or initiate war later under much more favorable circumstances. The tendency to consider preventive war is exacerbated if the declining state also sees itself as having a special, and fleeting, window of opportunity to prevent the shift. This essay reviews a range of evidence to argue that Vladimir Putin likely viewed Russia's strategic situation through a preventive war frame. NATO membership for Ukraine would shift the balance of power against Russia, and U.S. and NATO military cooperation with Ukraine intensified during the Joe Biden administration. These developments likely convinced Putin that he did not have much time to forestall Ukraine's NATO membership.

作者：Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky，以色列雷克曼大学政府、外交和战略学院全职教授。

摘要：本文追踪了俄乌战争对俄罗斯胁迫战略演变的影响。本文认为，在不同思想领域中，战略思维的演变方式各不相同。并且，威慑不是一个普遍的概念。文化因素决定了一个国家如何使用胁迫战略，并解释了不同案例间的差异。本文还为研究西方知识传统之外的胁迫战略和军事创新提供了框架。基于来自俄罗斯的原始资料的证据和俄罗斯战略文化的特质，本文对未来十年俄罗斯威慑战略的主要趋势做出假设，并展示了俄罗斯当局如何分析其在战争期间实施的胁迫手段带来的成败得失。俄罗斯的专家界从这些分析中得到的教训是，其2022年以前的威慑战略以及为支撑这些战略进行的部署均已过时。当前，俄罗斯的主要任务是恢复其胁迫政策的可信度，针对威胁俄罗斯重大利益的常规场景制定完善的核威慑政策，并为无核的周边竞争对手制定一种胁迫战略。

This article traces the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War on the evolution of the Russian approach to coercion strategy. The article argues that strategic thinking evolves differently in various ideational realms, and that deterrence is not a universal concept. Cultural factors condition how a state approaches coercion strategy and account for differences across cases. The article offers a framework for examining the strategy of coercion and military innovations outside the Western intellectual tradition. Building on evidence from Russian primary sources and the traits of Russian strategic culture, it hypothesizes about the major trends in Russian deterrence strategy for the next decade and shows how the Russian establishment analyzes the failures and successes of Russia's intra-war coercion. The main lesson that the Russian expert community has learned is that its pre-2022 deterrence strategy and the posture supporting it are obsolete. Russia's main priorities are to restore its coercive credibility, to refine nuclear coercion for conventional scenarios that threaten Russia's vital interests, and to develop a coercion strategy for a non-nuclear near-peer competitor.

作者：John M. Owen IV，弗吉尼亚大学政治学教授。

摘要：中美两个世界强国正在争夺国际秩序，这些国际秩序包括调节国家和社会间关系的规则、规范以及制度。美国及其盟国在二战后建立起自由主义国际秩序，中国对这一秩序存在的若干特征感到不满。中美在制度上的竞争正是大国竞相控制国际制度的体现。在拥有不同政治体制的大国之间，这种竞争尤为激烈。由于不同类型的国际秩序能够为不同类型的国家带来物质与社会优势，权力格局与安全态势岌岌可危。本文有关国际制度竞争的生态理论提出了三点主张：（1）国际制度倾向于选择一种特定的政体类型而非其他类型；（2）典型的政府认为，维持其政体类型符合本国核心利益；（3）大国能够塑造国际制度，以使其与自己选择的政体类型相匹配。通过对战间期（1919-1939）大国关系的研究，本文展示了这些动态变化。

The world's two great powers, China and the United States, are competing over international order—that is, the rules, norms, and institutions that regulate relations among states and societies. China's ruling party is discontented with several features of the liberal international order that the United States and its allies constructed after World War II. Sino-American struggles over the content of institutions suggest that great powers compete to control international institutions. Such competition is especially intense when great powers have different domestic regimes, such as democracy and autocracy. Power and security are at stake because different types of international orders can grant material and social advantages to different types of states. My ecological theory of competition over international institutions makes three claims: (1) international institutions select for one regime type over alternatives; (2) the typical government believes that it is in its core interest to preserve its regime type; and (3) great powers can shape international institutions to select for their own regime type. I demonstrate these dynamics in great power relations in the interwar period (1919–1939).

作者：Sheena Chestnut Greitens，德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校副教授，卡内基国际和平基金会非常驻学者，美国陆军战争学院战略研究所中国陆军研究中心客座教授；Isaac B. Kardon，卡内基国际和平基金会亚洲项目中国研究高级研究员，约翰-霍普金斯大学国际事务研究所（Johns Hopkins SAIS）兼职教授。

摘要：本文探讨了国际体系中出现的一种动态变化：世界各国都在与中国和美国展开安全合作。然而，中美两国提供的安全产品各不相同。美国主要向世界各国提供区域安全，即通过援助提高合作伙伴遏制或拒绝外部威胁的能力。中国主要向世界各国提供政权安全，即通过援助塑造合作伙伴控制其领土与人口的能力，这种援助往往是为了防止受援国政权受到威胁。许多国家都受益于这两种类型的援助，同时，无论中国还是美国，都不具备要求第三国与其保持排他性关系的强势立场。因此，越来越多的国家与这两个世界大国发展了非排他的、差异化的安全关系。本文将这种现象称之为“混合安全”，认为其无论在理论上还是实证中都有别于传统的制衡政策与全方位制衡政策。通过对越南和阿联酋两个国家的案例研究，本文阐明了这种动态现象。这两个国家在与美国进行国防合作的同时，还与中国保持了日渐强化的安全内部合作。混合安全将当前的大国竞争与冷战时期的大国竞争区分开来，并可能将在未来几年塑造国内与国际安全局势。

This article explores an emerging dynamic in the international system: Countries across the world are engaged in simultaneous security cooperation with both China and the United States. China and the United States, however, do not provide the same types of security goods. The United States primarily offers regional security—assistance that improves partners’ capabilities to deter or deny external threats to their territory. China primarily offers regime security—assistance that builds partners’ capabilities to control their territory and populations, and often, to prevent threats to a regime's hold on power. Many countries benefit from both types of assistance, and neither China nor the United States is in a strong position to demand exclusivity from third countries. As a result, a growing number of countries are developing nonexclusive, differentiated security relationships with both great powers. We call this phenomenon “security hybridization” and demonstrate that it is theoretically and empirically distinct from traditional balancing and omnibalancing. We illustrate this dynamic with two case studies—Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates. Each country engages in defense cooperation with the United States and, simultaneously, pursues increasingly robust internal security cooperation with China. Security hybridization distinguishes today's great power competition from Cold War rivalry and will likely shape patterns of domestic and global security in the years ahead.

作者：Jennifer Spindel，新罕布什尔大学政治学助理教授。

摘要：为什么国家会运输和寻求常规武器？在均势理论下，选择这种做法的原因似乎显而易见。然而，许多常规武器的转让并不符合均势理论的逻辑。本文的观点是，各国之所以寻求武器，是因为武器转让向他国发出了政治结盟的信号。在军备贸易相关文献中，对这一信号动态的误解是其在解释武器销售的原因和后果上得出不同结论的根源。为了解释信号动态如何与均势的因素相互作用，本文提出一种将武器转让视为象征性信号的理论。根据武器的军事用途与威力，本文对常规武器进行了分类。同时，本文还指出不同类型的常规武器转让代表不同的信号，这些信号表明了武器转让方与接收方之间在政治上的亲疏远近。通过研究1967年六日战争之前在中东的武器销售案例，本文展示了武器转让的这一信号功能。

Why do states send and seek conventional weapons? Though it may seem obvious that the balance of power motivates states to do so, numerous conventional arms transfers do not conform to the balance of power logic. This article argues that states seek weapons because arms transfers send signals about political alignments. Misunderstanding this signaling dynamic is part of the reason why the arms trade literature reaches divergent findings about the causes and consequences of arms sales. To explain how signaling dynamics operate alongside balance of power considerations, this article proposes a theory of arms transfers as symbolic signals. The article presents a typology of conventional weapons based on the weapons’ military utility and prestige and shows that different types of conventional weapons transfers send different signals about the political closeness or distance between the sender and receiver. I examine the case of arms sales to the Middle East before the 1967 Six-Day War to show the signaling function of arms transfers.

审核 | 赖永祯