【新刊速递】《国际安全》（IS），Vol.49, No.2, Fall 2024

作者：Jennifer Lin，达特茅斯学院政府学副教授、伦敦查塔姆研究所副研究员、哈佛大学赖肖尔日本研究所副教授

摘要：中国的崛起、俄罗斯的军事复兴以及印度的经济增长引发了学界有关单极化终结和未来均势的争论，这种争论历来是国际政治的主要议题。事实上，在二十世纪末，许多研究者都曾发出警告，认为日本和苏联将超越美国。然而，学者和政策制定者在如何定义权力或如何衡量权力分配的问题上，却几乎没有达成一致。本文介绍了一种比较国家间实力的归纳法，通过评估某些指标在预测历史体系中（1820-1990年）的权力均衡和区分大国与其他国家时所展现出来的效力，对衡量国家能力的常用指标进行了实证检验——这些指标包括经济和军事能力。首先，大国甚至超级大国之间国家能力的巨大鸿沟在历史上十分常见。无须与领导国平起平坐，大国就能参与到危险的安全竞赛中。其次，这种衡量方式表明，中国在大多数方面不仅是一个大国，而且是一个“超级大国”。最后，在这种衡量标准下，俄罗斯和印度都不能被称之为“超级大国”。并且，目前的国际体系是一个两极体系。这些发现为有关国际政治稳定性和未来国际秩序的辩论提供了参考，并表明，美国的大战略和联盟政策可能发生变化。

China's rise, Russia's military resurgence, and India's economic growth have prompted debates about the end of unipolarity and the future balance of power. Such debates are a staple of international politics; indeed, in the late twentieth century, many observers warned that Japan and the Soviet Union would overtake the United States. Yet scholars and policymakers evince little agreement on how to define power or measure the distribution of power. This article introduces an inductive method for comparing national power. I empirically validate common metrics of national capabilities - economic and military - by assessing their ability to both predict known balances of power across historical systems (1820-1990) and distinguish between great powers and other countries. This method yields three important findings. First, large gaps in national capabilities between great powers and even superpowers have been common throughout history. Great powers need not achieve parity with the leading state to engage in a dangerous security competition. Second, this method shows that China on most dimensions is not only a great power but a superpower. Third, neither Russia nor India is a great power. The system is bipolar. These findings inform debates about the stability of international politics and the future of international order and suggest the likelihood of shifts in U.S. grand strategy and alliances.

作者：David C. Logan，美国塔夫茨大学弗莱彻法律与外交学院安全研究助理教授

摘要：中国的核建设以及中美战略竞争的加剧引发了各界对中美未来核动态的担忧。随着中美核竞赛的升级，理解中国对战略稳定的看法对如何处理这两个全球大国之间的关系至关重要。冷战期间，不同的战略稳定概念影响了苏联和美国构建核力量和进行军备控制的不同方式。对美国战略界而言，战略稳定包括危机稳定和军备竞赛稳定。通过对大量中文资料进行的分析，本文发现中国的战略稳定观中明确了四大支柱：核相互脆弱性、双边关系总体情况、核禁忌以及对危机可控性的认识。中国的战略家们认为，由于美国的行动，这四大支柱的每一个都在削弱。这些发现对于理解中国的核力量发展、东亚的核动态以及中美关系具有重要意义。

China's nuclear buildup and intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition have raised concerns about the future of nuclear dynamics between China and the United States. As U.S.-China nuclear competition escalates, understanding Chinese views of strategic stability will be important for managing this dimension of the relationship between these two global powers. During the Cold War, different conceptions of strategic stability influenced how the Soviet Union and the United States constructed their nuclear forces and approached arms control. For the U.S. strategic community, strategic stability consisted of crisis stability and arms race stability. This article analyzes extensive Chinese-language sources and finds that Chinese writings identify four pillars of strategic stability: nuclear mutual vulnerability, the overall state of bilateral relations, the nuclear taboo, and beliefs about the controllability of nuclear escalation. Chinese strategists perceive each of these four pillars as eroding, in part because of U.S. actions. The findings have important implications for understanding China's nuclear force development, nuclear dynamics in East Asia, and U.S.-China relations. 

作者：Jeffrey A. Friedman，达特茅斯学院政府学副教授

摘要：美国外交政策的研究者和实践者通常将冷战初期描述为两党达成共识的“失落黄金时代”，本文利用民意数据、国会投票模式以及政党纲领声明反驳了这一传统观点。在杜鲁门和艾森豪威尔政府时期获得两党一致认可的核心国际主义原则，今天仍然得到了民主党和共和党的广泛认同。为了推行历史上没有产生过两党合作的政策，例如应对气候变化政策或长达数十年的武装建国政策，近几任总统扩大了美国的外交政策议程，这使得两党对杜鲁门-艾森豪威尔共识的持久支持被掩盖。因此，美国外交政策中不断加剧的政治极化主要是民主党与共和党以新形式部署全球影响力的结果，这并非意味着其放弃了传统的国际承诺。这些研究结果反驳了政治极化破坏了美国全球领导力或削弱了华盛顿可用力量的普遍观点。

Scholars and practitioners of U.S. foreign policy commonly describe the early Cold War as a lost golden age of bipartisan consensus. This article uses public opinion data, congressional voting patterns, and party platform statements to refute this conventional wisdom. In fact, the core internationalist principles that enjoyed bipartisan agreement during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations retain widespread approval from Democrats and Republicans today. Enduring support for this Truman-Eisenhower consensus is concealed by the way that recent presidents have enlarged the United States’ foreign policy agenda to pursue policies that historically did not generate bipartisanship, such as fighting climate change or conducting decades-long projects in armed nation-building. Rising political divisions in U.S. foreign policy are thus primarily a result of Democrats and Republicans deploying global influence in new ways rather than renouncing traditional international commitments. These findings refute widespread claims that political polarization has undermined traditional conceptions of U.S. global leadership or depleted Washington's usable power.

作者：Miranda Priebe，兰德公司资深政治学家，美国大战略分析中心主任；

Bryan Rooney，兰德公司政治学家；

John Schuessler，德克萨斯农工大学布什政府与公共服务学院国际事务副教授，阿尔布里顿大战略中心联合主任；

Jasen Castillo，德克萨斯农工大学布什政府与公共服务学院国际事务副教授，阿尔布里顿大战略中心联合主任

摘要：自美国2003年入侵伊拉克以来，现实主义者、保守主义者以及进步主义者中的一部分人就呼吁美国在大战略上保持更加克制的立场。由于克制在大战略辩论中的关键地位，本文将更详细地探讨克制战略范围内的各种变化。本文依据克制战略倡导者的著作以及访谈内容，确定了导致不同群体在克制问题上趋于一致的根本信念。本文发现，克制理论中存在相互竞争的观点。现实主义者希望在不引发大国战争的情况下防止地区霸权的出现，保守主义者试图维护其所认同的美国生活方式，进步主义者则希望消除国内外的不平等与不公正。即便是这些集体的内部，也存在着一系列的基本观念与外交偏好，并在俄乌战争和中国崛起的背景下出现了更多分歧。本文探讨了随着威胁环境的不断变化和新政策问题的出现，这些集体的立场将会如何演变。

At least since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a subset of realists, conservatives, and progressives have called for greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy. Given that restraint is a key position in the grand strategy debate, this article explores the variations within restraint's big tent in greater detail. Drawing on writings by and interviews with advocates of restraint, we identify the underlying beliefs that have led these disparate groups to converge on restraint. We find that there are competing visions of restraint. Realists want to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons without provoking great power war; conservatives seek to preserve what they identify as the American way of life; and progressives are motivated by the desire to combat inequality and injustice at home and abroad. Even within each group, there are a range of underlying beliefs and foreign policy preferences, and more divisions have emerged in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China's rise. We explore how these groups’ positions may evolve in the future as the threat environment continues to change and new policy questions emerge.

审核 | 赖永祯