【新刊速递】《国际安全》(IS), Vol.49, No.4, Summer 2024 | 国政学人

题目：The Iron Dice: Fatalism and War 

作者：Dominic Tierney，斯沃斯莫尔学院政治学Claude Smith教授

摘要：国际关系中的领导人经常表现出宿命论，或者认为一些事件是由他们难以控制的力量所驱使。在某些情况下，宿命论可能反映了现实，又或是一种提高支持的修辞。但是也有一种重要的心理学解释：宿命论可以帮助领导人避免为代价高昂的结果负责、并保护他们的自我形象。宿命论更像在如下情景中出现：1.关于好结果和坏结果的选择；2.当战争被视为迫在眉睫和遥远时的判断；3.非民主政权和民主政权之间的关系。宿命论的概念对哲学、宗教、医学、社会学和心理学至关重要，但它一直被国际关系学者所忽视。宿命论可能是战争的一个重要原因，尤其当它与被感知到的机会窗口相结合时。这项研究通过帮助解释代议制政权之间缺少战争来为民主和平论做出贡献。如果民选领导人不太容易对战争产生极端宿命论，民主国家在一个危机中可能有更多的回旋余地。本文使用第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战起源的案例研究来探讨这一论点。

Leaders in international relations often exhibit fatalism, or the belief that events are guided by forces beyond their control. In some cases, fatalism may reflect reality, or be rhetoric to boost support. But there is also an important psychological explanation: fatalism can help leaders avoid responsibility for costly outcomes and protect their self-image. Fatalism is more likely: (1) in regard to bad outcomes versus good outcomes; (2) when war is seen as imminent versus far-off; and (3) in nondemocratic regimes versus democratic regimes. The concept of fatalism is central to philosophy, religion, medicine, sociology, and psychology, but has been neglected by scholars in international relations. Fatalism may be an important cause of war, especially when combined with a perceived window of opportunity. This research contributes to democratic peace theory by helping explain the lack of war between representative regimes. If elected leaders are less prone to extreme fatalism about war, democracies may have more room to maneuver in a crisis. I use case studies of the origins of World War I and World War II to probe the argument.

题目：Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Assurance Dilemma in International Coercion 

作者：Reid B. C. Pauly，布朗大学政治学助理教授和核安全与政策院长助理教授

摘要：为什么有些胁迫性要求成功了，而其他的一些却失败了？一个主导范式通过指出威胁的可信度和严重性来解释胁迫性结果。胁迫保证（coercive assurance）这一概念在关于胁迫的文献中是一种缺乏研究的承诺问题。它表明胁迫者必须向胁迫目标保证，它的威胁是以目标的行为为条件的。许多学者忽略了胁迫保证，部分原因是因为他们认为这是自动的。但是保证是任何胁迫过程中的一个关键性要素。当胁迫者的保证不再可信时，即使是高度可信和严重的威胁也可能会失败。一种新的理论，即保证困境（assurance dilemma），有助于回答以下问题：为什么胁迫目标害怕无条件的痛苦？为什么胁迫者在得到服从后会进行惩罚？胁迫中的威胁和保证之间有什么关系？胁迫者为提高其威胁可信度而采取的行动会破坏其保证不会惩罚目标的可信度。胁迫对象担心惩罚可能无法避免，因此在屈服于胁迫者的要求之前会寻找保证信号。关于伊朗核计划的胁迫性讨价还价的案例证明了运用这一保证的逻辑和有效性。

Why do some coercive demands succeed but others fail? A dominant paradigm explains coercive outcomes by pointing to the credibility and severity of threats. The concept of coercive assurance is an understudied type of commitment problem in the coercion literature. It suggests that a coercer must assure its target that its threats are conditional on the target's behavior. Many scholars overlook coercive assurance, in part because they assume it is automatic. But assurance is a crucial component of any coercive process. Even highly credible and severe threats can fail when the coercer's assurance is not credible. A novel theory, the assurance dilemma, helps to answer the following questions: Why do targets of coercion fear unconditional pain? Why do coercers punish after receiving compliance? What is the relationship between threats and assurances in coercion? The actions that a coercer can take to bolster the credibility of a threat undermine the credibility of its assurance that it will not punish the target. Targets fear that punishment may be unavoidable and thus look for assuring signals before ceding to the coercer's demands. The case of coercive bargaining over the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates the logic and effectiveness of the use of assurance.

题目：Stabilizing Civil Wars without Peacekeeping: Evidence from South Asia

作者：Basil Bastaki，耶鲁大学政治学系博士生；Paul Staniland，芝加哥大学政治学教授；Bryan Popoola，约翰霍普金斯大学保罗·尼采高级国际研究院理学硕士和芝加哥大学文学学士 

摘要：维和有助于解决内战，但对于许多冲突来说，维和行动或其他国际和平建设干预的机会很小。在缺乏有意义的国际力量介入下，内战局面是如何通向稳定的？政府的政治性讨价还价空间和武装团体的相对实力这两个关键因素有助于解释国家和武装团体之间在何时有可能达成稳定的合作、或通过谈判达成和解。本文分析了三种冲突轨迹—“长期有限合作”措施、国家合并或裁军，以及持续冲突—来表明通往稳定的道路往往在道德上充满挑战和经验复杂性，但即使国际介入不在考虑范围内，也一样会存在。本文使用定量和定性数据来研究后殖民时期南亚大部分地区在较少或没有冲突时期中的武装团体和政府之间的关系。了解这些轨迹为政策制定者、分析人士和学者提供了有用的工具，用于在寻求减少战争的人员成本时确定政策选择和政治权衡。

Peacekeeping is helpful in resolving civil wars, but there is little chance of peacekeeping operations or other international peace-building interventions for many conflicts. How do internal wars stabilize in the absence of meaningful international involvement? Two key factors, the government's political space for bargaining and the relative power of armed groups, help to explain when it is possible to reach either stable cooperation between states and armed groups or negotiated settlements. We analyze three conflict trajectories—“long-term limited cooperation” arrangements, state incorporation or disarmament, and ongoing conflict—to show that the paths to stabilization are often ethically fraught and empirically complicated but exist even when international involvement is off the table. We use quantitative and qualitative data to study the relationships between armed groups and governments in much of post-colonial South Asia, including during periods of little or no violence. Understanding these trajectories provides policymakers, analysts, and scholars with useful tools for identifying policy options and political trade-offs as they seek to reduce the human costs of war.

编译 | 林志俊

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 张俊枫